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Abstract
Processes produce changes: rivers erode their banks and thunderstorms cause floods. 
If I am right that organisms are a kind of process, then the causally efficacious 
behaviours of organisms are also examples of processes producing change. In this 
paper I shall try to articulate a view of how we should think of causation within 
a broadly processual ontology of the living world. Specifically, I shall argue that 
causation, at least in a central class of cases, is the interaction of processes, that 
such causation is the exercise of a capacity inherent in that process and, negatively, 
that causation should not be understood as the instantiation of universal laws. The 
approach I describe has substantial similarities with the process causality articulated 
by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe for physical causation, making it plausible that 
the basic approach can be applied equally to the non-living world. It is an approach 
that builds at crucial points on the criticisms of determinism and universal causality 
famously articulated by Elizabeth Anscombe.
Keywords Causation · Causal process · Capacity · Process ontology · Process 
biology · Living systems · Organism
1 Introduction
Causation, as Augustine famously remarked of time, is something I seem to under-
stand very well until someone asks me to explain it. I experience it in my own 
actions. I swing an axe at a piece of wood and split it in two. Did I cause the wood 
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to be split? A slightly odd question perhaps, but one to which the answer is surely, 
yes. Similarly, I see a tree fall on my garage. Did the falling tree cause the garage to 
be destroyed? Again, surely yes. In these cases, I experience or perceive something 
(the log, the garage) being changed by something else (me, the tree). I know it when 
I see it.
But of course there is more. I don’t split the log merely by bumping into it or 
passing close by. So is the cause, strictly speaking, my swinging the axe in a certain 
way, an event, I suppose, rather than me? And if the event caused the splitting, and 
I’m surely not identical to the swinging, then can it be true after all that I caused the 
splitting? Perhaps I caused the event, and the event caused the splitting? But surely I 
am part of the axe-swinging event, and if so can I also be the cause of it?
If these questions can seem puzzling, one reason, I suggest, is that whereas we 
are very familiar with the idea that things can, in some sense, cause stuff to hap-
pen, we have a conception of a thing that makes this surprisingly problematic. The 
conception I have in mind is basically passive. Things may have many dispositions 
to act, or behave, but dispositions need to be triggered. The default state, absent the 
triggering of any dispositions, is stasis. So I may have a disposition to swing axes, 
but what triggered the disposition, what caused me to do it at the particular time 
that I did? And isn’t this triggering event the more genuinely explanatory cause? 
To do something an entity must undergo some kind of change, but it has long been 
recognised that it is a serious philosophical challenge to understand how a thing can 
change and continue to exist.1
This very sketchy background is intended to make sense of what I propose to do 
in this chapter. I believe that the world is not composed of static things, but rather 
of more or less dynamic processes. What we think of as things, or substances, are in 
fact processes, actively stabilised over particular time scales. I have only attempted 
to argue for this in any detail with respect to living beings (Dupré, 2020; Dupré & 
Nicholson, 2018), but I strongly suspect that this is the right way also to think of the 
non-living world. If the latter claim is mistaken, then what I shall say is limited in 
application to the living; that is, anyhow, a very important part of the causal network 
in which we find ourselves.
For processes, as I think of them, change is unceasing. Stasis is death or annihila-
tion. Consider a simple paradigm, an eddy in a river. The eddy just is a pattern of 
movement of parts of the water, and if the water ceases to move, the eddy ceases 
to exist. Moreover, I take it that the eddy is a persistent entity. As long as the water 
continues to move in the right way, the eddy persists. This is just the way to think of 
an organism, I maintain. It is a pattern in the flow of matter, maintained by countless 
movements and interactions of its material parts. Movement is change, so change 
underlies the existence of everything. As substance metaphysicians sometimes won-
der why there is something rather than nothing, a process metaphysician might ask 
why there is change rather than stasis. But that will not be my question today. If 
1 For a survey of the history of this problem see Mortensen (2020). For an argument that it is ultimately 
insoluble within traditional conceptions of substance, and that we need to replace this with a process 
ontology, see Meincke (2019).
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anything is primitive and beyond explanation, for the process metaphysician it is 
change.
In a world of process, the problem of causation is that of understanding the inter-
actions of processes. This is, indeed, exactly what existing process theories of cau-
sation, notably by Salmon (1984) and Dowe (1992, 2000), have attempted to do. 
Unfortunately, their concerns were explicitly limited to physics, and so of limited 
relevance to the biological issues that are my main concern. Salmon’s starting point 
is the concept of a causal process, one that transmits its own structure. This aligns 
very well with the idea of a persistent process which is central to my own posi-
tion here. However, there are important respects in which the development of the 
idea in a physical context diverges from what is needed for a biological account. For 
example, much of Salmon’s exposition uses as a foil the idea of a “pseudoprocess”, 
such as a spot of light moving across the roof of a building generated by a moving 
light source. Unlike a genuine process, a pseudo process cannot transmit a mark. 
Nothing you do to the light spot on the ceiling at one point will change its state at a 
later point. But if there are pseudoprocesses in biology (one may indeed be afraid of 
shadows, but that is often for the good reason that dangerous animals cast shadows) 
they are not the major problem in distinguishing biological processes. The more 
pressing problem is that of distinguishing biological individuals from the biological 
processes in which they are embedded (see, e.g., several essays in Guay & Pradeu, 
2016); but this is not because any part of this processual nexus is illusory. In the 
context of causality correct identifications of individuality may be crucial for finding 
the right entities over which to formulate causal generalisations, but is seldom nec-
essary for identifying the occurrence of causal activity. If I observe a tiger sinking 
its teeth into the neck of an antelope, I do not doubt that there are two causal pro-
cesses in my vision (more or less sensu Salmon) and that they have interacted. For 
some purposes it is important to decide whether the gut microbiome of the tiger is 
part of the tiger process, or another one or many engaged in a long-term interaction 
with it. But from the point of view of the observed causality just described this ques-
tion is irrelevant. Following Anscombe (1975), I shall assume that a lot of causality 
is immediately observable.2
Much of the metaphysical background of my account will be taken for granted. 
I assume without much argument that biological individuals are persistent causal 
processes, and that their interactions with one another and their environments are 
causal. By sketching some further features of this terrain, I hope to show that this 
is a productive way of thinking about causality, at least in biology. One thing that I 
think should be clear from this sketch is that much of what Anscombe argued for in 
her famous inaugural address makes (even more) sense in a world of causally pow-
erful processes.
2 Following Michotte (1963), there is a body of empirical work confirming the perceivability of causa-
tion. Needless to say, the philosophical interpretation of such work will depend on one’s understanding 
of causation, and is not entirely straightforward.
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2  Locating process theories in the metaphysics of causation
We have moved a long way from the orthodoxy Anscombe addresses in her inau-
gural lecture. First, probabilistic causality is widely acknowledged, obviously 
problematizing the necessity and universality that Anscombe saw as defended by 
her contemporaries and the Humean tradition. Second, and following from the 
denial of universality, it has become much more respectable to attribute causal-
ity to a single, perhaps unique occasion. These changes no doubt owe a lot to the 
influence of Anscombe’s work. The ideas presented in this paper will be broadly 
congenial to Anscombe’s important insights on causality. Like Anscombe, I am 
deeply sceptical of universality and indeed, as is now common among philoso-
phers of biology, I am even sceptical of the laws in which universality has tra-
ditionally been inscribed. I agree that causation is something all around us, the 
visibility of which is only concealed by the grip of dogma. This becomes all the 
more obvious in the light of a metaphysical thesis I have advocated for a number 
of years, that our world is a world of processes rather than of substances. How-
ever it is thought that substances act, change, or do anything, activity is not at the 
heart of the concept of a substance. The default state of a substance is stasis. A 
process, on the other hand, ceases to exist if it does nothing—in fact, I take this 
to be the defining characteristic of a process. And to do something is to change, 
either oneself or some other part of the world; in short it is to be causal. There is 
no storm without the movement of something, even if the environment is so well 
battened down that only the wind and rain themselves are moving. When even 
these are quiet, there is no longer a storm.
What is this orthodoxy Anscombe rejects as Humean? Hume’s famous ideas 
about causation begin with the rejection of metaphysical causal necessity, and are 
based on the idea that we never see the necessary connection between cause and 
effect; we just see the succession, for example of the impact of one billiard ball on 
another and the movement of the second. If the connection cannot be found in the 
interaction between the two, then it must be sought elsewhere. And the place Hume 
proposed, a solution that continues to attract many adherents, is in the regularity 
of the connection between events similar to these two. It identifies causation with 
universality—for A to cause B is for there to be universal regularity that when-
ever A, then B—and necessity. Although Hume is famous for his scepticism about 
metaphysical necessity—it is always possible for A to be followed by not-B—he 
was quite clear that necessity was involved in the meaning of causality, and he felt 
obliged to provide a psychological explanation of this, specifically via the tendency 
of regularities of experience to lead to ever stronger expectations of regularity. In the 
Humean tradition philosophers such as Mill (1843) and, roughly contemporaneously 
with Anscombe, Mackie (1974), laboured to describe the universal generalisations 
that made our everyday causal claims true. Also around the same time Lewis (1974) 
took up another aspect of the Humean corpus, and offered an account of causation 
in terms of counterfactual generalisations. More recently, Woodward’s (2005) influ-
ential difference-making account illustrates one of the increasingly sophisticated 
moves that have been made in a broadly Humean direction.
1 3
Synthese 
The work of Mill and Mackie just noted, and of which Mackie’s account of an 
individual cause as an inus condition—an insufficient but necessary part of an 
unnecessary but sufficient condition—is perhaps the most refined exemplification, 
elaborates the implications of a cause as a necessary and sufficient condition of its 
effect under the description that accommodates it to universal law. But perhaps the 
greatest insight of Anscombe’s paper is that while the necessity of a cause for its 
effect is an intuitive idea3 (the cause as that without which the effect would not have 
happened), sufficiency is a far more dubious philosophical add-on. When I say that 
he would not have crashed the car had he not been drunk (his intoxication was a 
necessary condition for the crash), I certainly do not assume that the crash was a 
done deal the moment he started driving. In the search for sufficiency a whole set 
of additional factors are hypothesised as together bringing about the inexorable dis-
aster. But the assumption that there is such a complete set of factors seems more a 
philosophical prejudice than anything implied by the original causal assertion.
One way of accepting the rejection of causal sufficiency is with a move to cau-
sality as probabilistic. In the first instance this takes the form of the proposal that a 
cause doesn’t necessitate its effect, but merely raises it probability. Smoking makes 
contracting lung cancer much more probable, but many lucky smokers escape this 
fate. But this may seem to fit easily enough into a modified Humean frame. Suppose 
just that for A to cause B probabilistically is for there to be a law of nature that some 
proportion of As be followed by B. If, given sufficient specification of the condi-
tions, this probability can be made precise, then a certain kind of universality is even 
maintained, if only at the level of the population. Better still, it is often supposed 
that a probabilistic generalisation is merely one in which not all the relevant factors 
have been specified; when they have, the probability will be 1 or 0. The probability 
is not a contradiction of the deterministic, law-governed world, but merely a meas-
ure of our ignorance.4
There has, at any rate, been a tendency, at least among naturalistically inclined 
philosophers, to move towards positions on the anti-Humean side of this dichotomy, 
a tendency that has been motivated in part by the perceived decline in importance 
of scientific laws. Highly influential work by Cartwright (1983) has led many to 
doubt whether even physics could really generate true universal laws. With regard 
to probabilistic causality, fully general laws of the kind postulated in the last para-
graph, x% of As cause Bs, have proved difficult to characterise adequately. It has 
become increasingly attractive to treat such non-deterministic causality as merely 
the outcome of capacities (As can cause Bs), made more or less likely to be exer-
cised by the presence of further interacting conditions. And then why should there 
not be capacities that are just exercised sometimes but not at other times, but for 
which the frequency of exercise has no particular tendency to converge on a fixed 
value (Dupré, 1993, ch. 9; Lewontin, 1966)? While not many philosophers have 
3 Though especially following Lewis (1974), it has been widely noted that causal necessity is problema-
tized by the possibility of overdetermination. I shall say a bit more about this later in the paper.
4 For an argument that a Humean account of probabilistic causality is not, in the end, possible, see 
Dupré and Cartwright (1988).
 Synthese
1 3
enthusiastically embraced this last possibility, philosophers of biology have at least 
been increasingly ready to agree that there may be no universal laws in the life sci-
ences (e.g. Beatty, 1995; Brandon, 1997).5
We should anyhow look more closely at another way forward that Anscombe 
does not explicitly discuss, the rejection of Hume’s strictures on causal powers, 
capacities and so on. This is an idea that has been promoted from time to time, and 
increasingly of late; heretics include Harré and Madden (1975), Cartwright (1989), 
and Mumford and Anjum (2011). Despite important differences, all these thinkers 
see causation as the exercise of capacities grounded in the properties of individual 
entities. They also generally see causality, as did Anscombe, as something readily 
observable in the world, and referred to by countless causal verbs (push, pull, throw, 
paint, cut, sharpen, infect, vaccinate, frighten, educate, etc.), adjectives (pushy, 
attractive, sharp, contagious, frightening, etc.) and nouns referring to things with 
these capacities (tractor, knife, virus, scarecrow, vaccine, etc.). These seem, on the 
face of it, to be observable causal activities, properties and entities in the world. For 
these dissident philosophers, Hume’s refusal to see causality has profoundly misrep-
resented a world which is in fact seething with causality for all to see. As Anscombe 
remarks, the Humean is “just not going to count anything as ‘observation of causal-
ity’” (1975, p. 68).
Accounts of this anti-Humean kind have evolved in recent years in two direc-
tions. One that has been very widely discussed in the last 20 years focuses on mech-
anisms, (Craver, 2007; Glennan, 1996, 2017; Machamer et al., 2000). Ignoring a lot 
of detailed disagreement, mechanisms in this picture are arrangements of powerful 
entities that interact in ways that produce some kind of output. Mechanisms are pro-
posed in the first instance as providers of explanations. The contraction of a muscle, 
for instance, is explained by showing how the arrangements, connections and activi-
ties of muscle cells jointly generate this effect. But of course, this is not just a once 
off explanation for a particular contraction. For as long as the right arrangement 
and connection of these cells survives, the cell will retain the capacity to contract. 
Mechanisms are generally explanations of causal capacities (and hence strongly 
anti-Humean).
Actual machines make the point easier to illustrate. Why is all the grass on my 
lawn roughly the same length? Because I ran my lawnmower over it. My lawnmower 
has the capacity to cause grass to be cut to a uniform length, and it produced just this 
effect on my lawn. Why does it have this capacity? Because its parts, with their own 
capacities—cutting, pushing, igniting, and so on—are connected together in a way 
designed to bring about this effect, specifically by generating the rapid movement 
of blades at a fixed distance above the ground. There is nothing to prevent someone 
from insisting that there are universal laws instantiated by the interactions of lawn-
mowers and lawns, but once the existence of such capacities has been conceded, 
there is no strong motivation for such an insistence.
5 This is also related to a move, especially in the life sciences, from the syntactic to the semantic view 
of scientific theories, the analysis of theories in terms of models rather than proposition (see, e.g., van 
Fraassen, 1980; Lloyd, 1988).
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In a different vein I have been quite critical of mechanisms (Dupré, 2013; Dupré 
& Nicholson, 2018; see also Nicholson, 2012, 2013). However, I do not deny that 
talk of mechanisms has an important and often valuable place in the biological sci-
ences, and this place has been illuminated by mechanistically-minded philosophers. 
My reservations arise at the level of metaphysics: mechanism should not be taken as 
providing an adequate image of what the living world is really like. Mechanisms nat-
urally present a picture that is (a) strictly bottom-up: the properties of parts explain 
the behaviour of the whole; and is (b) composed of fixed, thing-like entities, as in a 
machine.6 Both these elements are generally false of biological systems. The parts 
are not fixed, but are constantly being created, modified or destroyed; and the prop-
erties and behaviour of the parts are often determined to some degree by the system 
as a whole. However, much biological explanation certainly does involve showing 
how parts—stable on the time scale relevant to the explanation—interact to produce 
the behaviour of larger scale entities. I shall sometimes refer to these as mecha-
nisms, or mechanistic, but it should be noted that I do not thereby endorse substan-
tial parts of (influential versions of) the contemporary mechanist programme. I take 
the mechanisms appealed to in explanations to be abstractions from the flow of liv-
ing process; they abstract not only from the full range of causal influences, but also 
from the changing and always temporary natures of the parts that they do include.
Another anti-Humean tradition in recent decades has grounded causes in pro-
cesses. This was initiated by Salmon (1984) and has been developed especially by 
Dowe (1992, 2000). These philosophers see causation as manifested in causal pro-
cesses and interactions between causal processes. For Salmon, causal processes are 
defined by the ability to transmit a mark (thereby being distinguished from pseudo-
processes such as moving shadows) and interacting processes may leave marks on 
one another. Dowe criticises this account on several grounds, and proposes instead 
that a causal process “is the world line of an object that manifests a conserved quan-
tity” (1992, p. 201) such as mass-energy, linear momentum or charge; an interaction 
involves the exchange of such a quantity. Although my aim in this paper is to present 
a process-based account of causation, because of the focus of Salmon and Dowe 
on physics, I shall not dwell on details of this work beyond endorsing a metaphys-
ics of causation grounded in processes and their interactions. Dowe (1992) actually 
admits that it would be difficult or impossible to apply his account outside physics 
but assumes that other sciences will at least supervene on the physical. Even if this 
were so, which I see no reason to believe (Dupré, 2010, pp. 44–5), it would still 
leave us needing to account for the apparently causal processes and interactions that 
abound throughout the life sciences.
6 It will fairly be objected that these theses present a crude picture of mechanism that ignores the subtle-
ties that mechanists have developed to distance themselves from them. The most recent statements of the 
mechanist position, indeed, have much in common with the processualism I advocate. One concern is 
that the further mechanists move from these common associations with the view, the more it seems able 
to accommodate any empirical data, and the more vacuous it is in danger of becoming (Dupré, 2013). I 
should be clear that my position is at any rate much closer to mechanism than to the law-based accounts 
of biology that preceded it.
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The processes that interest me particularly are persisting, or continuant, pro-
cesses.7 A paradigms might be a storm or a horse. This categorization of a horse is 
of course controversial, but as I have argued for it extensively elsewhere (e.g. Dupré 
& Nicholson, 2018), I shall be fairly brief here. The storm and the horse are both 
processes, in my view, because their persistence is achieved through activity. For 
the storm this is the activity of circulating winds, driven by thermal energy acquired 
from the atmosphere. That storms persist is clear from the fact that they sometimes 
even have names; Hurricane Laura, for instance, visited Haiti, Cuba, Florida and 
Louisiana on its travels in August, 2020. For Salmon, causal processes transmit their 
own structure, and this is certainly a distinctive feature of many biological entities. 
The horse maintains its integrity through a host of metabolic activities ultimately fed 
by the food and oxygen the animal eats and breathes. A striking feature of processes 
such as organisms is that they not only include activities that maintain specific fea-
tures, such as the homeostatic maintenance of temperature, but they also maintain 
characteristic trajectories, including the overall developmental course of the system. 
Waddington (1940) described the maintenance of such a trajectory as homeorhetic. 
A further crucial point is that it must not be assumed that the activities that stabilise 
such a process, whether homeostatically or homeorhetically, are all internal. In fact, 
organisms are deeply intertwined with many features of their biotic and their abiotic 
environments, and this is vital to their homeostatic and homeorhetic stability. The 
central point to emphasise about the persistence of a process is that it persists not 
by default, as is commonly supposed of persisting substances, or things, but as an 
achievement, a consequence of activities within or around it. I am highly doubtful 
whether there are any things that persist in the default way. Even the most seem-
ingly inert objects, diamonds or lumps of gold, say, would fall apart if there were not 
interactions between atoms, and interactions between the subatomic particles that 
make up the atoms. Whether the very lowest level, if indeed there is one, is best 
thought of as processual is a question beyond the scope of this paper. For now I 
insist only that in biology nothing persists except through hard work.
So to summarise so far, I take organisms among other biological systems to be 
causal processes in a sense quite similar to that described by Salmon and Dowe. The 
persistence of such processes is made possible by many further causal processes and 
interactions both between parts of the system and between the system and aspects of 
its environment. The biological processes I am interested in have numerous causal 
capacities. We generally expect to be able to explain these capacities in terms of 
7 There is a good deal of metaphysical controversy that I am passing over here. A traditional view 
divides persistent entities into continuants, which are said to be wholly present at all times at which they 
exist (they “endure”), and occurrents, which are made up of a sequence of temporal parts (they “per-
dure”). Processes are taken to be paradigms of occurrents. I am generally unhappy with this distinction, 
in part because I find it hard to understand what it is (and what it is not) to be wholly present. My own 
view is that all persisting entities have temporal parts, but that these are all in the past and present, not 
the future. Some philosophers take this view to be inconsistent with the physics of time. The catego-
risation of processes as occurrents is also being debated. Stout (2016) believes that processes are both 
occurrents and continuants. Steward (2015) holds that some processes persist, but do so in a way that is 
distinct both from perdurance and endurance.
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interactions either among their parts or between them and other entities. An impor-
tant subset of such explanations consists of those that have been described as mecha-
nistic. I take all this to be no more than description of the place of causal language 
in our accounts of the biological world. But this description places the process view 
of causality squarely in the anti-Humean camp, and makes it clear that that univer-
sality is at best an optional part of such an account.
3  Kinds of process
This is a good point at which to make clear that a simple unitary answer to the ques-
tion what is causation is unlikely to be forthcoming. Elsewhere (Dupré, 2013) I have 
defended this view in more detail, arguing that many or all of the various accounts of 
causation mentioned above have distinct uses. Here I am concerned more narrowly 
with the causality in biology, and more specifically still with the way that causality 
is inherent in, or emerges from, persistent biological processes. But even here there 
is an important element of pluralism, reflecting the different kinds of process that 
can be found in living systems. In particular, I have in mind homeorhetic processes, 
homeostatic processes and processes without any particular stabilisation. Homeor-
hetic systems are perhaps the most characteristic in biology. They are exemplified, 
for example, by organisms.8 On a much smaller scale, countless homeorhetic pro-
cesses occur within the organism. Think, for instance, of the sequence of events that 
lead through transcription, various kinds of splicing, translation and protein folding 
to a mature protein molecule. This, incidentally, is neither a process that happens to 
something (there is no thing to which it happens) nor is it the kind of process that 
might have been taken for a thing or substance. It is just an “unowned” process, 
strongly homeorhetically constrained.
The difference between homeostasis and homeorhesis may in some cases be just 
a matter of time scale. A reasonably long-lived adult animal is naturally treated as a 
homeostatic system for the purposes of its day-to-day activities and this is also the 
appropriate perspective for much medical science. Strictly speaking it is, of course, 
continuing to develop, or age, but this is of no significance for understanding its cur-
rent feeding, sleeping, grooming, or whatever behaviour. More strictly homeostatic 
is something like the mature cardiovascular system of an animal. It will, of course, 
eventually fail. But this is probably not because it has features the function of which 
is to make it fail. Like everything else, it will eventually wear out, though the extent 
8 One might worry that this is not the case for by far the majority of organisms, the unicellular ones. But 
there is, of course, the familiar cell cycle leading to and through the division of the cell. This is some-
times thought of as an oscillation that maintains a stable system. And in fact microbial cells age (Moger-
Reiscer and Lennon, 2019). A condition of this is asymmetric reproduction, as if reproduction were sym-
metrical, all the cells would be the same age, and ageing of the cell could not be distinguished from 
ageing of the lineage. But, in fact, microbial cells do divide asymmetrically, and the mother cell tends to 
monopolise accumulated damage, so that eventually it no longer functions. This incidentally suggests a 
very general explanation of ageing as accumulation of damage balanced against reproductive rate.
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to which biological failure is inevitable or perhaps, on the contrary, functional, is a 
matter of some debate.
Finally, there are countless biological processes that are neither homeostatic nor 
homeorhetic. Ecology and epidemiology provide good examples. Think of the devel-
opment of a viral epidemic. It will shrink or grow depending on all kinds of extrin-
sic contingencies concerning the behaviour of host organisms and the states of their 
immune systems, as well as on its own random mutations. It is also possible that 
some processes might be classified as homeorhetic or not depending how loosely 
they are described. Most of vascular development appears not to follow any definite 
path, but the end result is typically a system that provides blood supply to the whole 
organism. Indeed, development generally can be seen as involving a homeorhetic 
core with a periphery of increasingly opportunistic or even random processes.
With these categories in mind we can look at various kinds of intersection 
between causal processes. One important question is whether the intersection dis-
rupts the homeostasis or homeorhesis of either or both of the processes. The violent 
interactions that feature so prominently in the philosophical literature on causation 
tend to do this. When Jane shoots Jim, Jim will often cease to be either a homeor-
hetic or a homeostatic system. Similarly with the predatory interactions that form a 
growing proportion of David Attenborough television shows.9 But most interactions 
between or affecting organism-processes fall into one of two other categories.
One very important category comprises those interactions that exactly fall within 
the functional ranges of the homeostatic systems. A good example is the interac-
tion between an organism and a microbial infection. The microbes are of course 
just doing what they do, replicating themselves in their natural environment. A vital 
homeostatic system in the host is the immune system, one function of which is to 
prevent or limit the damage caused by such an interaction. If all goes reasonably well 
a small part of the microbial lineage passes through the host and the host suffers a 
manageable amount of inconvenience or damage. These effects, however severe, are 
said to be caused by the pathogen. During the interaction, many individual microbial 
cells will be destroyed by the immune system, suffering a fate similar to Jim’s above.
When the stabilising processes work perfectly, we tend not to think of a causal 
interaction at all. I don’t notice the small rise in ambient temperature because I adjust 
for it by perspiring slightly more. It would, however, be true to say that the rise in 
temperature caused the increase in perspiration rate. This just points to the familiar 
fact that the stabilising processes work through multiple smaller scale causal interac-
tions. Equally important in this category are the cases in which interactions between 
organisms just are parts of the stabilising system. Here I have in mind the omnipres-
ence of symbiosis. Various chemical activities by bacteria in the cow’s stomachs 
enable the cow to digest the cellulose in grass. Treating the bacterium and the cow 
as independent processes, this implies some kind of interaction between the two. 
But regardless of the outcome of the contemporary debate whether these really are 
9 For non UK-based readers, Attenborough has been a presenter of outstanding nature documentaries for 




independent individuals or one (the so-called holobiont), this discussion will be bet-
ter subsumed under a general consideration of internal processes below.
Much causal interaction between individual organisms belongs in the oppor-
tunistic or, from a biological point of view, random categories. The latter is simple 
enough. A coconut falls on my head and knocks me out. The impact of the coconut 
caused me to be unconscious. With luck, my stabilising processes will kick in and 
restore proper function without lasting damage. This is, no doubt, what they were 
designed to do, though it is unlikely that the evolutionary history of this design had 
much to do with coconuts.
Many opportunistic interactions are more interesting and directed. Organisms 
move around the world encountering more or less unexpected items. They may 
interact with such an item in numerous ways: eat it; mate with it; flee from it; use 
it to construct a shelter; play with it; and so on. These causal interactions may con-
tribute to the stability or instability of the interacting participants, and may be more 
or less core parts of the stabilising processes. The capacity to interact in appropri-
ate ways such as those mentioned above with other organisms or inanimate objects, 
either deliberately sought or accidentally encountered, is a characteristic feature of 
all living systems. The more specific capacities deployed in these interactions are 
central aspects of the natural history of particular organisms.
An organism, I argue, is a complex process that maintains a more or less sta-
ble complex structure by virtue of the internal metabolic processes that maintain its 
thermodynamic equilibrium. Parts of this structure, such as teeth, cognitive abilities 
to outwit the evasive strategies of prey, and suitable digestive systems, are also nec-
essary conditions for the maintenance of the metabolic stabilisation of the overall 
system, but their necessity derives from their role in making possible essential inter-
actions with other organisms. Plants do things very differently. But their ability to 
respond developmentally to experienced environmental features is essentially analo-
gous. Indeed, the plant meristem is a paradigm example of a flexible and responsive 
process, developing into leaves, flowers, roots, and so on in adaptive response to its 
environment. A meristem may, for example, start to produce roots in response to its 
encounter with the soil (itself a massively complex process).
So far I have shown how, if one accepts the process view of biological systems, 
something quite similar to the Salmon/Dowe picture of causation as intersecting 
processes extends naturally to a wide range of biological examples. An organism 
is, more or less, the world line of a process that manifests and transmits the qual-
ity of being alive. The quality is not conserved in the way that physics describes 
mass/energy or momentum as being conserved, but conserving it is, nonetheless, 
exactly what organisms do. Organisms, in particular, bristle with capacities to inter-
act with entities in their environments in ways that conduce to their staying alive. 
But they may or may not do so when they encounter suitable targets. Following Ans-
combe, there is no reason to suppose that these interactions instantiate laws either 
as instances of universal generalisations or even of statistical generalisations with 
determinate probabilities.
Organisms are profoundly causal processes: their persistence manifests a myriad 
internal causal interactions, and equally depends on constant causal interactions 
with entities beyond their boundaries. But there are many questions generally taken 
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to be causal that do not fit so easily under the rubric just outlined. In particular, we 
may ask either, why does this entity (process) have this capacity, and also, why does 
it exercise the capacity on this occasion? Let me turn now to the first of these. These 
are the kinds of questions most naturally emphasised by new mechanists. How can 
the wolf track the passage of a potential prey animal? It has sensors in its nose and 
an arrangement of neurons in its brain that enable it to distinguish minute quantities 
of distinctive odoriferous chemicals shed by the relevant prey species. This is the 
kind of explanation that is generally claimed as mechanistic, or at least as a mecha-
nism sketch. Although a capacity of an organism will be sustained by internal causal 
processes, these are not generally the same processes that occur when the capacity 
is exercised.
Having said that a process ontology can readily accommodate much of the 
explanatory work that has been assimilated to the mechanist programme, I should 
make clear that there is no difficulty in reconciling a process ontology with the 
undoubted successes of the mechanistic explanatory strategy. Most mechanistic phi-
losophers, following the classic paper by Machamer et al. (2000), distinguish activi-
ties from the entities that undergo them. The entities are generally understood as 
things, or substances. But if the entities are themselves processes, all that is required 
is that they be sufficiently stable over the time scale of the behaviour being explained 
to play the assigned role in the mechanism. A key feature of biological processes is 
that they are stabilised over some period of time. The appropriate period of time 
determines, and in a functional or evolutionary sense is no doubt equally determined 
by, precisely the kinds of mechanisms in which they participate. Of course, it is pos-
sible to go wrong by assuming more stability than is actually provided. One may, for 
instance, wrongly extrapolate the results of medical experiments to older or younger 
age groups. But it is certainly not necessary to make such mistakes.
A more subtle concern about mechanistic explanations is that the processes that 
stabilise the entities in an explanation are often higher-level processes, instances 
of “downward” causation. It might then appear that mechanistic explanations are 
incomplete. In response to this, it seems to me enough to insist that it is unimagina-
ble that there are any complete explanations. I shall, however, have a little more to 
say later about downward causation.
What of the second question, why does an organism exercise a capacity on a 
particular occasion? A fox comes round a corner and sees a rabbit. Suppose we 
have established that it has the right kind of teeth and digestive system to con-
sume rabbits, and that it can run fast enough to (sometimes) catch them. Suppose 
even that we have full explanations of the grounds of these capacities. Should 
that, in principle, tell us what happens at this crucial intersection of processes? 
Surely not. The rabbit almost certainly attempts to escape as soon as it notices 
the fox. But how soon does it notice the fox? Perhaps its attention is elsewhere. 
The fox may make an estimate, accurate or inaccurate, of the likelihood of catch-
ing the rabbit given their relative positions. It may be hungry, a bit hungry, or not 
hungry at all. Perhaps it is preoccupied with a potential mate or it has a plan for 
a more easily and reliably acquired meal. And so on. A complex and intelligent 
organism like a fox reaches a decision based on a wide range of variable fac-
tors that may be salient at the time. There is no algorithm in the fox’s brain that 
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somehow determines this decision by feeding in a determinate set of parameters, 
and absent a pre-existing commitment to determinism, no reason to suppose that 
there is any set of factors either necessary or sufficient for the decision.
It is an attractive supposition that the ability to respond appropriately to com-
plex and partially unprecedented situations is a characteristic feature of living 
systems, and increasingly characteristic of increasingly complex and sophisti-
cated organisms. So to the question why did the organism exercise a particular 
capacity on a particular occasion there may be several answers, and there may be 
no answer that is fully determining. The fact that it was hungry, the rabbit was 
looking the other way, would be cornered if it ran directly from the fox, etc., may 
all partly explain the fox’s decision to pursue the rabbit, but even jointly may not 
determine it. And in a rather different vein, the bramble stem’s contact with the 
soil, the resources available to the plant, the dampness of the soil and perhaps 
other chemical components of the soil, may all contribute to the plant’s “deci-
sion” to put out a root. But why should we assume there must always have been a 
sufficient condition when such an action occurs?
It is a familiar observation that we may provide either a “proximate” or an 
“ultimate” explanation of a feature of a biological system (Mayr, 1993). The 
mechanistic explanations just discussed are proximate, and are thoroughly causal. 
Are ultimate explanations, explanations in terms of evolutionary history, also 
causal? Think of the relationship between the organism and the lineage to which 
it belongs. Clearly both depend on the other. The lineage generates organisms and 
the organisms perpetuate the lineage. Moreover, as Darwin famously emphasised, 
by producing a huge excess of organisms, more, that is, than the environment can 
sustain, the lineage can “choose” which of its varying productions will perpetu-
ate the lineage. The lineage does not of course have a nervous system that makes 
such choices, or even a chemical network that serves a somewhat analogous func-
tion for a plant. Nonetheless, like an organism, it is a process that responds to a 
changing environment in ways that are conducive to its survival.
The reproductive capacities of organisms, in particular, are both necessary for 
the perpetuation of the lineage and, a fortiori, necessary for the existence of the 
organism. More exactly, the organism would not exist if there were not a line-
age that generated it, and the lineage would not exist if some of the organisms it 
generated did not have the capacity to reproduce. These necessities are causal. 
Just as the causal capacities of molecules and organs enable the persistence of the 
organism process, so the persistence and the reproductive capacities of the organ-
isms enable the persistence of the lineage. And they do so, of course, by being 
exercised. Reproductive capacities, in particular, are exercised on the occasions 
of suitable causal interactions between organisms of opposite sexes (where the 
species is a sexual one). Similarly, the exercise of capacities to breathe, feed, etc., 
occurs in causal interaction with oxygen molecules and other organisms.
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It is time to take stock. Living systems, I argue, are best seen as formed of a 
hierarchy of processes,10 stabilised over characteristic time periods. Such systems, 
and their constituent processes, interact with one another in countless ways. Some 
of these interactions are essential parts of the stabilisation processes of higher-level 
systems, whether internal interactions, of the kinds that have been much stressed 
by recent mechanists, or external, interactions with the wider world that the sys-
tem requires to maintain itself. The cells of a multicellular organism interact with 
one another to maintain the stability of the organism. Organisms of the same spe-
cies interact with one another to sustain lineages; in the case of organisms of differ-
ent species, there is a lively debate over whether their interactions contribute to the 
maintenance of systems at an ecological level. All of these interactions are appro-
priately described as causal, and in a high proportion of cases the causal interac-
tion involves the exercise on the part of one or both of the participants of capacities 
that have been exquisitely honed by natural selection precisely for the purpose their 
exercise serves. And, with one more nod to Elizabeth Anscombe, there is no reason 
to think that the exercise of such capacities is in satisfaction of any universal law or 
regularity. On the contrary, the better understanding of the conditions surrounding 
such exercise is the key to understanding the autonomy often attributed to organisms 
of all kinds, and most especially to humans.
I said I would return to the question of downward causation, and in fact I have 
already touched on the topic. The dependence of the organism on the lineage to 
which it belongs is an example. Now it will certainly be said that this is a dubi-
ous example. It is, after all, the organism’s parents that cause its existence and they 
may be said to screen off the imagined influence of the lineage. But without pursu-
ing this case here, it is easy to find less controversial examples. The cells in my 
liver provide various metabolic services to my body; but the persistence of my liver 
depends equally on its embedding within a system that contains blood vessels to 
carry its inputs and outputs, lungs to provide oxygen to the bloodstream, and even a 
brain that enables the organism to find food. The liver is not a thing that carries on 
functioning until something goes wrong, but a process, constantly maintained and 
stabilised by the complex system in which it is embedded.
Recalling the response I imagined to the case of the lineage’s effect on the organ-
ism, something similar may well be said for these other cases. It is the pumping of 
the blood, the oxygenation of my blood in the lungs, electrical events in the brain, 
and so on that maintain the liver, not the whole in which all these are embedded. 
There are several things that might be said in reply to such a move. First, one must 
be cautious with such screening arguments. My throwing the brick is, in one sense, 
screened off from causing the window to break by the brick’s impact with the win-
dow; by the time it reaches the window it is irrelevant who threw it. But this would 
10 The idea of a hierarchy needs to be treated carefully. I do not assume that there is one universal hier-
archy within which every biological entity has its place, just that the full understanding of a particular 
biological system will require attention both to systems internal to it, its parts, and further systems of 
which it is a part. This does not imply that there is a unique set of entities that form the parts of a system. 
In fact I believe that the identification of parts is to some degree dependent on the questions we want to 
ask of the system.
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be a sorry excuse for an excuse. I did, in fact, throw the brick and initiated the causal 
process that led to the window breaking. I caused the breaking of the window.
But a second response is much more interesting and convincing. Screening off 
fails when there are alternative pathways from the initial cause to the effect. And it 
is a characteristic feature of biological systems that they are able to achieve impor-
tant end points from multiple starting points and via multiple pathways. One kind 
of example is natural selection. One cannot imagine reducing a process of natural 
selection to all the individual matings and dyings that actually occur, as there are 
countless other sets of such events that would equally well have achieved the same 
result. The explanation is the preponderance of a feature giving a selective advan-
tage in all of these sets. But similar redundancy is characteristic of more classically 
mechanistic cases.
It has been recognised for some time that mutations to the genome frequently pro-
duce little or no effect on the phenotype. It is often remarked that many gene knock 
outs often have no effect. Gene expression is remarkably robust. Typically robust-
ness is achieved in machines by redundancy, that is, by duplication of parts. But 
it seems that this is not the main explanation of the robustness of gene expression, 
and that robustness is somehow distributed through the system (Wagner, 2005). The 
system compensates for the failure or absence of a component by changing the roles 
of existing parts and achieving the outcome in a different way. Hence, focusing on 
the particular pathway fails to identify the more robust capacity the system has to 
produce the observed effect. And this is just as true for the effect of the lineage on 
the organism as it is for the case of gene expression and countless others. In a world 
of universal regularity there is no question of looking for the level at which causa-
tion occurs, because as is often argued, universality can only coherently apply to one 
level, the lowest. But Anscombe, among others, has taught us that there is no reason 
to think we live in such a world; I do not believe that we do. In a world where causal 
regularity is local, perhaps even exceptional, we need to look for where the genuine 
regularity emerges. And as I have just explained, in many cases in biology this is at 
the higher level.11
4  Conclusion
I take this essay to be an exercise in naturalistic metaphysics. Though the account of 
organisms as processes may strike many as radical or revolutionary, the arguments 
for this view (Dupré & Nicholson, 2018) are no more than reminders of uncontro-
versial scientific facts about organisms. The present essay takes this conclusion for 
granted and attempts to show that thinking of organisms and other biological sys-
tems as partially stabilised homeostatic or homeorhetic processes and considering 
the various kinds of interactions they have with one another is a good way of think-
ing about the causal interaction between and within biological individuals. I don’t 
11 Questions of universal lawlikeness, emergence, and downward causation, are explored in more detail 
in Dupré (2021) Sects. 2 and 3.
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claim that it is the correct account of all contexts in which we speak of causation, 
as I doubt whether there is any such account. I do claim that it is at the very least a 
good way to understand a large proportion of the causal claims that are made in the 
life sciences. It is also, incidentally, and bearing in mind the placement of this essay 
in a themed collection on Elisabeth Anscombe’s famous inaugural lecture, a good 
context in which to see that the analysis of causation has no need of the necessita-
tion or determinism against which Anscombe so powerfully argued.
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